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KANT'S RELIGIOUS ARGUMENT FOR THE
EXISTENCE OF GOD: THE ULTIMATE DEPENDENCE
OF HUMAN DESTINY ON DIVINE ASSISTANCE
Stephen R. Palmquist

After reviewing Kant's well-known criticisms of the traditional proofs of
God's existence and his preferred moral argument, this paper presents a de
tailed analysis of a densely-packed theistic argument in Religion within the
Bounds of Bare Reason. Humanity's ultimate moral destiny can be fulfilled
only through organized religion, for only by participating in a religious
community (or "church") can we overcome the evil in human nature. Yet
we cannot conceive how such a community can even be founded without
presupposing God's existence. Viewing God as the internal moral lawgiv
er, empowering a community of believers, is Kant's ultimate rationale for
theistic belief.

I. The Practical Orientation o f Kantian Theology
Kant is well known for attacking three traditional attempts to prove
God's existence: the ontological, cosmological and physico-theological
(or teleological) arguments. All such "theoretical" arguments inevita
bly fail, he claimed, because their aim (achieving certain knowledge of
God's existence) transcends the capabilities of human reason. Viewed
from the theoretical standpoint, God is not an object of possible human
knowledge, but an idea that inevitably arises as a by-product of the to
talizing tendencies of human reason. The very process of obtaining em
pirical knowledge gives rise to the concept "God," and this enables us
to think and reason about what God's nature must be if God exists; yet
we have no "intuition" of God (neither through sensible input nor in any
"pure" form), so we can have no reasonable hope of obtaining theoretical
knowledge of God's existence.
All three traditional arguments, in Kant's estimation, aim to establish
such theoretical certainty, so they are all bound to fail. Ontological argu
ments fail because we cannot reason from a pure concept ("God") to an ac
tual object (God, as the goal of theoretical proof). Cosmological arguments
fail because we cannot intuit the entire existing universe (the "world" God
is supposed to have created) as an empirical object, so we do not know
whether it must obey the same causal laws that individual objects within
the empirically knowable universe must obey. And teleological arguments
fail to establish knowledge (though they can inspire belief), because we
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cannot know whether the powerful intelligence that seems to have shaped
the world for our benefit actually created it as well.1
Ever since Mendelssohn portrayed Kant as an anti-metaphysical "all
destroyer" who was supposedly aiming to put an end to theology and reli
gion, this reputation has been imputed to Kant by many commentators. In
the mid-nineteenth century the influential German writer, Heinrich Heine,
intensified this traditional reading by calling Kant the "arch-destroyer in
the realm of thought" who put forward "destructive, world-annihilating
thoughts."12 He called Kant's first Critique "the sword that slew deism in
Germany,"3 depicting its criticism of the traditional theistic proofs as "one
of the [book's] main points" —so important that we ought to "recognise
everywhere visible in [the first Critique] his polemic against these proofs."4
The polemic s goal, Heine argues, was to demonstrate that "this ideal . . .
being, hitherto called God, is a mere fiction."5
Thanks to a growing number of voices opposing this traditionally nega
tive reading of Kantian theology in recent years, it is slowly coming to be
recognized as a gross perversion of Kant's intentions. Many interpreters of
Kant's theological and religious views now agree that Kant intended his
criticism of the traditional theistic arguments not as an assault on the valid
ity of theology or religion, but as a preparation for a more authentic way
of rationally affirming God's existence.6 The traditional arguments, being
theoretical, would not provide a suitable theological basis for religion, even
1Kant advances these arguments in Critique o f Pure Reason (trans. Norman
Kemp Smith [Edinburgh: Macmillan, 1929], hereafter CPR), Transcendental Dialec
tic, Chapter III; page references cite the B edition. For a detailed explanation of
what Kant's theoretical arguments entail and why their failure does not rule out
theistic belief, see Stephen Palmquist, Kant's Critical Religion: Volume Two o f Kant's
System o f Perspectives (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), chap. IV and appendix IV.
2Heinrich Heine, Zur Geschichte der Religion und Philosophie in Deutschland
(1859), trans. J. Snodgrass as Religion and Philosophy in Germany (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1959), p. 109.
3Ibid., p. 107.
4Ibid., pp. 115-116.
5Ibid., p. 115.
6In addition to the various articles that culminated in Kant's Critical Religion,
see the collection of essays in Kant and the New Philosophy o f Religion, ed. Chris
L. Firestone and Stephen R. Palmquist (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
2006), where fourteen scholars share a common standpoint the editors of the
latter volume call the "affirmative" approach to interpreting Kant. The Editors'
Introduction provides a thorough-going sketch of the history of the tradition
ally negative approach, followed by an exhaustive overview of the books in
English focusing on Kant's philosophy of religion since Allen W ood's Kant's
Moral Religion (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1970) and Michel Despland's Kant on History and Religion (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press,
1973) first turned the tide toward the affirmative. Although in most cases they
did not explicitly align themselves with the manifesto proposed in my early
article, "Immanuel Kant: A Christian Philosopher?" (Faith and Philosophy 6.1
[January 1989], pp. 65-75), interpreters since the early 1990s have been adopt
ing a more and more affirmative approach to Kantian theology and philosophy
of religion.
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if they succeeded.7 Aiming to achieve scientific-type knowledge of God's ex
istence, rather than humble belief, their success would encourage human
beings to believe we can manipulate God the way we manipulate objects in
the natural world.
In place of the traditional theoretical arguments, Kant introduced an
entirely new approach to arguing for God's existence that he believed
would have a more healthy influence on the way people view God. His
special "moral" argument carries a more qualified practical validity:
Kant never assigns it the status of an absolute proof, as the theoreti
cal arguments claim to achieve. Wood's explanation of the argument as
constituting a "reductio ad absurdum practicum" (i.e., a proof that requires
any atheistic moral person either to postulate God's existence as an ex
planation for why persevering in morally good conduct makes sense, or
else to give up the claim that moral behavior is rational) is still one of the
clearest and most persuasive accounts.78 Scholars have discussed the de
tails of Kant's moral argument so thoroughly that the generally accepted
position is now that, at least in this instance, Kant saw his philosophy as
having generally affirmative theological implications—though the more
skeptical interpreters think Kant's argument fails, rendering his affirma
tion misplaced.
While the importance of Kant's moral argument to his overall philo
sophical system is now widely recognized, many commentators remain
unconvinced that he also intended to make specifically religious affirma
tions. Interpreters still tend to view Kant as having a highly abstract,
excessively rational theology, with little or no relevance to the experi
ence or belief affirmed by ordinary church-goers.9 The exceptions to this
7In CPR, xxx, Kant explicitly states the goal of his Critical philosophy is to
protect religion and morality from the negative effects sophistical and skeptical
philosophers can have on them. Similarly, in his Lectures on Ethics (trans. Louis
Infield [London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1930], pp. 86-87), he says: "In religion the
knowledge of God is properly based on faith alone. . . . [So] it is not necessary for
this belief [in God] to be susceptible of logical proof. . . . [For] sophistication is
the error of refusing to accept any religion not based on a theology which can be
apprehended by our reason. . . . Sophistication in religious matters is a dangerous
thing; our reasoning powers are limited and reason can err and we cannot prove
everything. A speculative basis is a very weak foundation for religion."
8See Wood, Moral Religion, pp. 25-34. The vast subsequent literature on this
argument need not be reviewed here. For an overview of the first twenty years of
literature discussing Wood's interpretation of the moral theory in Kant's Critique o f
Practical Reason, see Stephen Palmquist, Kant's System o f Perspectives: An Architec
tonic Interpretation o f the Critical Philosophy (Lanham: University Press of America
1993), §Vin .3.B. For a recent account of the alleged weaknesses of the argument
from a more skeptically-minded interpreter, see Peter Byrne, Kant on God (Alder
shot: Ashgate, 2007), chaps. 5 and 6.
9For example, Mark Lilla, "Kant's Theological-Political Revolution," The Review
o f Metaphysics 52.2 (December 1998), p. 412, says: "It is . . . hard to imagine anyone
taking genuine comfort from immortality or God as Kant conceives them." He
later (p. 421) adds: "The postulates of immortality and God are the most Kant
can offer to meet this threat [of self-contempt]. They are, to say the least, ghostly
humanistic substitutes for the real thing. In fact, there is no resurrection from the
dead or God to whom we can turn." While this may be plausible as a depiction of
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tendency are increasing as the affirmative approach gains momentum,
with more and more scholars willing to see Kant's philosophy, especially
his later writings, as providing a stable foundation for a healthy and sus
tainable religious life.10*The reason Kant often appears to adopt a nega
tive approach to religion, especially in Religion, is that most examples of
religious belief and practice in his day (as perhaps also today) were a
far cry from conforming to the ideal he believed reason presents of the
authentic religious life. Nevertheless, even among scholars who explicitly
adopt the affirmative approach to interpreting Kant's theology and reli
gion, few have recognized that in Part Three of Religion Kant provides a
new and strikingly different argument for God's existence.11 Kant intends

the Kantian theology we find in the three Critiques, I argue here (and elsewhere)
that it is far from true of the position Kant advances in Religion within the Bounds o f
Bare Reason, (trans. G. di Giovanni as Religion within the Boundaries o f Mere Reason
in Religion and Rational Theology, ed. A. W. Wood and G. di Giovanni [Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996]), hereafter Religion. As we shall see in §IV, Lilla
acknowledges a role for religion in Kant's moral system, though he does not think
it offers any more "comfort" than the postulates.
10In addition to the works already mentioned, the books by Gene Fendt (For
What May I Hope? [New York: Peter Lang, 1990]), Adina Davidovich (Religion as
a Province o f Meaning: The Kantian Foundations o f Modern Theology [Minneapolis,
MN: Fortress Press, 1993]), Walter Lowe (Theology and Difference: The Wound o f
Reason [Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993]), Curtis H. Peters (Kant's
Philosophy o f Hope [New York: Peter Lang, 1993)), Sidney Axinn (The Logic o f Hope:
Extensions o f Kant's View o f Religion [Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi, 1994]), Regina
Dell'Oro (From Existence to the Ideal: Continuity and Development in Kant's Theology
[New York: Peter Lang, 1994]), Elizabeth Galbraith (Kant and Theology: Was Kant a
Closet Theologian? [London: International Scholars Publications, 1996]), John Hare
(The Moral Gap: Kantian Ethics, Human Limits, and God's Assistance [Oxford: Clar
endon Press, 1996]), Charles Kielkopf (A Kantian Condemnation o f Atheistic Despair:
A Declaration o f Dependence [New York: P. Lang, 1997]), and A. W. Moore (Noble
in Reason, Infinite in Faculty: Themes and Variations in Kant's Moral and Religious
Philosophy [London: Routledge, 2003]) are noteworthy, though not all of these
authors go as far as they could in affirming the specifically religious significance
of Kant's philosophy.
uThe argument appears in Religion pp. 97-99 (Part Three, Division One, §II). Al
len Wood ("Rational Theology, Moral Faith, and Religion," in The Cambridge Com
panion to Kant, ed. Paul Guyer, pp. 394-416 [Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1992]) acknowledges that Kant's arguments in support of "faith in a divine
grace" (p. 403) can be regarded as supplementing his moral argument, but does
not call attention to this passage. Hans Lenk identifies a "sociomorphic" argument
for God in the passage ("Sociomorphic Arguments for a Moral God: Kant's Second
and Third Moral Arguments for the Postulate of God's Existence," Man and World
22, p. 103), but leaves it undeveloped. Peters offers a formalized version of the
argument (Philosophy o f Hope, pp. 101-102), but without acknowledging the way
it lends support for belief in God (see note 20, below). And John Hare ("Kant on
Recognizing our Duties As God's Commands," Faith and Philosophy 17.4 [October,
2000], p. 470) mentions the argument in passing, but says nothing about its distinct
form or purpose in comparison to the moral argument, interpreting it instead as
if it were based on Kant's technical concept of the highest good, just as the moral
argument is.
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this argument, I shall claim, to provide a great deal more "comfort" than
the moral argument on its own ever could.12
My strategy will be to present the context and text of Kant's "religious"
argument (§lI), then analyze its details (§III) and finally assess its valid
ity and the applicability it may have to a community of religious believ
ers (§IV). I shall argue that Kant employs this special argument to justify
his explicit (but often neglected) claim that organized religion is necessary
for the fulfillment of humanity's ultimate moral quest. Lest I (or Kant)
be accused of arguing in a circle, I must add that the term "religious"
here refers not to belief in God, but to participation in a community that
has the (moral) character Kant refers to as "religious." (Kant's individualist
version of this special argument will be discussed only briefly, in §IV.) If
the argument's inferences are valid, it takes us significantly further in our
philosophical quest for a justification of religious belief than does Kant's
moral argument on its own, for its conclusion offers religious believers
access to a power that would otherwise be either inaccessible (for atheistic
or agnostic attempts to be moral) or ineffective (for religious approaches
that recognize the source but misuse the power in question).
II. The Context and Primary Text o f the Religious Argument
Kant sets the stage for his religious argument by establishing in Part One
of Religion that humanity (i.e., every normal human person) by nature has
a "good predisposition" that is infected at its root by an "evil propensity."13
The latter perverts our moral decision-making process from the outset of
our moral development.14 He goes on in Part Two to argue that a solu
tion to this problem is possible only through a fundamental revolution in
one's character (a "change of heart") that empowers a person to recover
the proper way of making moral decisions—namely, to treat the moral law
as one's primary incentive for ethical choice, even when it conflicts with
desires that arise out of our nature as phenomenal beings having specific
mental and physical needs. Religion is possible, and inevitably arises in
human societies, only because solving the problem of personal evil re
quires "divine assistance" (i.e., what theologians typically call "grace")
to succeed (see note 25, below). Kant thinks philosophy is incapable of
identifying a particular historical vehicle as necessary to bring about this
result, though philosophy can establish a rational form that can test the
12See Palmquist, Kant's Critical Religion, where the summary of the argument's
structure is sketchy and slightly inconsistent with the more detailed account pro
vided below.
13In my article, "Kant's Quasi-Transcendental Argument for a Necessary and
Universal Evil Propensity in Human Nature," The Southern Journal o f Philosophy
XLVI (2008), I argue that Kant uses a "quasi-transcendental" argument to defend
both claims. In a nutshell, his argument (like that for space, time and causality in
CPR) is that anyone who grants that we experience some degree of moral failing
must accept the universal application of these two human attributes.
14In "Kant's Quasi-Transcendental Argument," especially §4, I demonstrate
that Kant repeatedly portrays the moral depravity he attributes to human nature
as having been there from the start, even though in some (admittedly mysterious)
sense, each of us chooses to make it our own.
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validity of any historical faith's claim to have conveyed God's grace to a
given community. As an example of this philosophical procedure, Part
One (especially Section IV [Religion, pp. 39-44]) assesses the validity of
the Christian doctrine of original sin: it is "inept" in its typical historicalgenetic interpretation; but if understood as referring to the rational origin
of all evil, it constitutes a suitable version of the practical (moral) problem
that cries out for a religious solution (i.e., the problem of the evil propen
sity in human nature). Likewise, Part Two (especially Section I, subsection
B [pp. 62-66]) assesses the Christian doctrine of grace through the atoning
sacrifice of Jesus as morally harmful if presented in a way that removes
the believer's duty to effect his or her own self-improvement, but as "valid
for us, as a precept to be followed" (p. 64) if it is understood as depicting
an internal rational model (the "prototype of perfect humanity") that each
person should strive to imitate.
At the outset of Part Three, just when the attentive, religiously-attuned
reader may think the problem of the evil propensity (or original sin) has
been solved by the availability of the prototype of perfection (or atoning
grace), Kant argues that, even if a person experiences (or claims to have
experienced) such divine assistance at an individual level, the battle is far
from over. The individualistic solution of Part Two cannot permanently
solve the problem of personal evil, because the most any given person
can do is to engage in a struggle between the newly empowered good pre
disposition and the evil propensity. In the opening pages of Part Three
Kant claims our tendency as human beings to act in self-centered ways
remains a part of our nature, so even a "well-disposed" person, one who
has experienced a conversion from evil-heartedness to good, will tend to
be overcome by evil "as soon as he is among human beings."15 He goes on
to argue that the evil in human nature can be permanently overcome—i.e.,
a genuine victory of good over evil is possible—only when good-hearted

15Religion, p. 94. Allen Wood, "Religion, Ethical Community and the Struggle
Against Evil" (Faith and Philosophy 17.4 [October], pp. 504-505), interprets this pas
sage as Kant's conclusion that "[t]he source of evil . . . is social." As I demonstrate
in "Kant's Quasi-Transcendental Argument" (2008), this ignores Kant's own argu
ments in Part One of Religion, that evil originates in reason and therefore must have
a transcendental origin in any philosophical analysis. Human society is respon
sible not for evil's origin, but for its enduring presence. The point of Part Three's
Introduction is that people who have experienced a change of heart, who may
therefore be regarded as "well-disposed" persons, are nevertheless still suscep
tible to the influence of evil. Ironically, Wood himself points out ("Struggle Against
Evil," p. 505) that if evil has a social origin, "then the most natural inference from
this might be that the struggle against it should take the form of self-isolation (the
solution of the hermit)." Yet as Wood observes (without explaining how this can
be), Kant firmly rejects the hermit's solution! He rejects it because hermits tend to
attribute to society something grounded in individuals as members of the human
species; society merely manifests evil in its most obvious forms. Having shown in
Part Two how religion must attack the rational origin of evil in the individual, Kant
now turns in Part Three to show how religion must attack its manifestation in
society. If Wood were right, if Kant thought evil originated in society, the individual
could not be blamed for making evil choices—an outcome Kant repeatedly warns
against throughout Religion.

KANT'S RELIGIOUS ARGUMENT

9

individuals join together to participate in a religious community governed
by rational (moral) principles.
Kant initially describes this community using a neutral, non-religious
term, the "ethical community" (or ethical commonwealth) to indicate the
rational form a religious community must take in order to fulfill its proper
function. Unfortunately, many (if not most) commentators emphasize this
non-religious term to such an extent that they mistakenly portray him as
saying this community is not genuinely religious. As a result, Kant's theory
of the ethical community is frequently discussed in the literature, while
only rarely do we read about his theory of the church.16 Yet Kant explicitly
argues in the first four subsections of Part Three's Division One that the
ethical community must become a religious community (a "church") in
order to succeed.
That this point is so frequently ignored indicates a bias among Kantscholars, many of whom would rather not think of their hero as sup
porting the church (an institution whose empirical manifestation is often
unenlightened), and who therefore tend to skip lightly over these sub
sections. Nevertheless, in these pages, Kant clearly does argue from the
duty of an ethical community to the necessity of the church as a religious
community. In order to preserve their preference for "ethical community"
over "church" as a description of Kant's argument in Part Three, com
mentators must neglect an argument presented in subsection II, where
Kant first presents the ethical community as a unique duty of the human
race to itself. What has been wholly ignored or (when acknowledged)
downplayed is that Kant's argument explicitly ties this duty to the rational
need for "a higher moral being" (Religion, 98). Embarrassing though this
fact may be for skeptical or non-religious Kant scholars, the remainder of
Religion examines not the ethical community as such, but the ethical com
munity as religious—i.e., the church. My focus here will not be on those
later sections of the book, but on the transitional argument that appears in
the very section where Kant first claims that joining the ethical community
is a special human duty.
The term "ethical community" is not Kant's last word on the subject of
how human beings can secure a lasting victory over evil, but only a tenta“Examples of this biased emphasis abound. Philip Rossi's recent book (The
Social Authority o f Reason: Kant's Critique, Radical Evil, and the Destiny o f Human
kind [Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005]) is a good illustration,
especially because the author cannot be accused of being anti-religious himself;
yet his index entry for "church" (p. 192) says only "see ethical commonwealth,"
and among the numerous subentries under the latter, "as church" cites only eight
relevant pages (p. 193). Likewise, Wood exclaims ("Struggle Against Evil," p.
509): "it is virtually impossible to overestimate the importance of organized reli
gion in Kant's scheme of things." Yet Wood explicitly uses Kant's preferred term,
"church" (p. 508), only once. For two exceptions to this trend, see Quinn ("Kantian
Philosophical Ecclesiology," Faith and Philosophy 17.4 [October, 2000], pp. 512-534),
who tackles the issue of "Kantian ecclesiology" head on, but neglects the crucial
argument we shall be examining here, and Palmquist ("Philosophers in the Public
Square: A Resolution of Kant's Conflict," in Kant and the New Philosophy o f Religion,
pp. 230-254), where I take seriously the potential for Kantians to take up public
positions (e.g., as church leaders).
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tivefirst word. He makes this clear when, after comparing the "ethical state
of nature" with the "juridical state of nature" in the first paragraph of sub
section II (Religion 96-97), he argues in the second (and final) paragraph
that the community's purpose cannot be realized without weaving into it
a belief in God as an internal moral lawgiver to all participants. After de
scribing the ethical state of nature as one consisting "of inner immorality
which the natural human being ought to endeavor to leave behind as soon
as possible" (Religion, 97), Kant writes:
Now, here we have a duty sui generis, not of human beings toward
human beings but of the human race toward itself. For every species
of rational beings is objectively—in the idea of reason-destined to
a common end, namely the promotion of the highest good as a good
common to all. But, since this highest moral good will not be brought
about solely through the striving of one individual person for his
own moral perfection but requires rather a union of such persons
into a whole toward that very end, [i.e.] toward a system of welldisposed human beings in which, and through the unity of which
alone, the highest moral good can come to pass, yet the idea of such
a whole, as a universal republic based on the laws of virtue, differs
entirely from all moral laws (which concern what we know to reside
within our power), for it is the idea of working toward a whole of
which we cannot know whether as a whole it is also in our power:
so the duty in question differs from all others in kind and in principle.—We can already anticipate that this duty will need the presup
position of another idea, namely, of a higher moral being through
whose universal organization the forces of single individuals, insuf
ficient on their own, are united for a common effect.
Following a brief transitional sentence, the heading of subsection III then
identifies this "higher moral being" as "God" by stating, as if to clarify the
conclusion of the foregoing argument, that "the concept of an ethical com
munity is the concept of a people of God under ethical laws" (p. 98).
This densely-packed argument presents what I call a "religious argu
ment" for God's existence, where the term "religious" refers to a commu
nity grounded in mutual belief in a divine moral being. Like its famous
counterpart, the moral argument in the second Critique, it should not be
regarded as a theoretically valid proof. For as we saw in §I, Kant devotes
considerable effort to demonstrating why all such proofs fail, and at no
point does he backtrack on that position. But unlike the moral argument,
where we find no more than an abstract "postulation" of God, whose prac
tical force rests in its ability to help us understand how moral conduct
can be rational even though it does not always make us happy, this new
argument carries with it an empirical (social) force that must, if successful,
manifest itself in the unmistakably concrete form of the victory o f good over
evil in a human community—a goal explicitly stated in the title of Part
Three. Before we can assess the validity of this argument, we must scruti
nize Kant's difficult language, carefully analyzing the argument's logical
structure. In §III I shall therefore go back through the above-quoted para
graph, analyzing Kant's argument one step at a time in hopes of unpack
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ing the logic of each premise, presenting each as itself the conclusion of a
subordinate argument based on a distinct set of logical premises that Kant
apparently expects the reader to recognize.
III. Analyzing the Argument's Four Steps
The above-quoted paragraph from Religion, 97 begins by introducing the
concept of a new and unique kind of human duty, "not of human beings
toward human beings but of the human race toward itself." Kant presents
this duty as the first premise of his argument by defending it in a single
sentence: "For every species of rational beings is objectively—in the idea
of reason—destined to a common end, namely the promotion of the high
est good as a good common to all." This first step can be understood as a
mini-syllogism with one implied premise and one key term, "the highest
good," only minimally explained. Understanding why Kant says so little
here about the meaning of this key term is crucial to appreciating the force
of his argument.
That "highest good" is a technical term in Kant's moral philosophy
might suggest he is here merely assuming its technical meaning, taking
for granted that readers are familiar with his previous use of the concept.
However, this would be a strange move, in light of his claim in the sec
ond edition Preface that the arguments in Religion require no familiarity
with his Critical writings, but "[o]nly common morality," whose "matter
itself is contained, though in other words, in the most popular instruc
tion for children or in sermons, and is easily understood." If the logic
of Kant's new argument is based on his technical concept of the highest
good, then his failure to defend or even specify its meaning at this point
commits the potentially fatal error of grounding his argument's valid
ity on an exceedingly problematic concept.17 Another possibility is that
Kant does not describe or even mention his theory of the highest good
here because this new argument does not depend on the details of that
theory; rather, he uses the term in the quoted text as a general reference
to whatever good one deems "common to all" members of the species.
Kant himself obviously must think of this good as the situation where
all people are rewarded with happiness in proportion to their virtue.
But by calling it merely a "good common to all," he here neither denies
nor affirms his own preferred (and rather complex) way of defining the
concept; he thus protects the religious argument from being unneces
sarily linked to the validity of his previously defended moral argument
for God's existence—a dependence that would render his argument here
so problematic (due to all the problems raised by critics of the moral
17Largely because Kant mentions the highest good here as part of his argument
that the ultimate victory over evil must be social, some commentators have argued
that Kant meant the concept to be a socially-oriented one all along. Jennifer Moore,
for example, claims that throughout Kant's ethical writings "the highest good is
always a social good" ("Kant's Ethical Community," The Journal o f Value Inquiry 26
[1992], p. 55). By contrast, Rossi (Social Authority, p. 7), thinks the social orientation
of the highest good was not emphasized in Kant's primary Critical writings, where
he defined that technical term as "the proper apportionment of happiness to ac
cord with each individual's moral virtue."
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argument)18 that I could not hope to defend his position successfully in
a single article.
Taking the text's non-committal reference to "highest good" at face
value, we can express the underlying logic of this first step (using paren
theses here, as throughout the arguments displayed in this section, to de
marcate premises Kant does not state explicitly, but merely assumes) as
follows:
1.

Every species of rational beings is objectively destined to pursue a
good common to all members of that species as its "highest good."

2.

(Every species of rational beings has a unique, collective duty to
pursue its objective destiny.)

3.

The human race is a species of rational beings.

4.

Therefore, the human species has a unique, collective duty to itself,
to promote its highest good among all human beings.

Kant gives us no clue why he thinks the first premise is true. Apparently,
he regards it as analytic: the very conception of a species of rational be
ings is the concept of beings who promote as their collective (highest)
good a good that is common to all. In other words, promoting an alleged
"highest good" that is not common to all members of the species would be
irrational. Presumably, Kant would defend the second (implied) premise
in a similar way, inasmuch as "objective destiny" refers to an end one
would be foolish to work against. Regardless of whether Kant would re
quire us to interpret "highest good" here in his technical sense, we can see
that the main point of this first step of Kant's argument is that the "duty"
forming the basis of the overall argument is tied not to individuals, but to
humanity as a species.
The next (third) sentence constitutes more than half of the quoted para
graph and advances two intertwined claims that are best examined sepa
rately, as distinct premises. The first is that this new duty requires "a union
. . . into a whole" of all persons who are "striving . . . for [their] own moral
perfection" as constituent parts of this big picture of human "destiny."
What Kant posits here is more than just a group of perfection-pursuing
individuals, but individuals who together see their moral conduct as
working toward "the highest moral good" of the species, in the form of "a
system of well-disposed human beings . . . , as a universal republic based
on the laws of virtue." Kant's actual argument is thread-bare at this point,
merely previewing a claim he defends more fully in the next subsection.
As we shall see at the end of §III, Kant's subsection III argues that the laws
governing an ethical community must be internally legislated in order to
retain their status as ethical. As a result, we cannot establish the ethical
community through any political (i.e., humanly-contrived, externallylegislated) organization. It must be established in such a way that each
18Peter Byrne (The Moral Interpretation o f Religion [Edinburgh: Edinburgh Uni
versity Press, 1998], pp. 70-93) has argued, for example, that the moral argument
in the second Critique fails precisely because the components of the highest good
cannot withstand a rigorous philosophical analysis. For his most recent account of
the argument's failure, see Byrne, Kant on God, chaps. 5 and 6.
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member of the community generates the laws that govern the community
within his or her own reason.
With the subsequent argument of subsection III in mind (summarized
below in square brackets), we can reconstruct the logic of Kant's second
step as follows:
1.

In order for the "common good" affirmed by this new duty to be
truly common, it must include all morally responsible members of
the species.

2.

(The human species consists of individual persons each of whom is
morally/internally responsible for his/her own conduct.)

3.

[In a political community the laws are externally legislated and co
ercive, so they cannot be "common to all"; there will inevitably be
a "ruler" and a "ruled."]

4.

[In an ethical community the laws are internally legislated and non
coercive, so they can be "common to all"; no human individual can
legislate the moral law on behalf of another human individual.]

5.

Therefore, this new duty must establish a purely ethical communi
ty by systematically uniting the self-legislation of each person who
pursues (however imperfectly) the ideal of his or her own moral
perfection.

The first premise of this second subordinate argument merely explicates
what Kant means by "common good." The second premise, implied by
the first, appears to be taken for granted as a basic tenet of any ethical
system. It is analytic inasmuch as Kant would claim anyone who is not
morally responsible should not be counted as a legitimate member of the
community he is attempting to establish as necessary. As Kant discusses
the rationale behind the third and fourth premises in subsection III, I
shall examine them more fully at the close of §III. On the basis of these
premises, the second major step in Kant's argument follows as a necessary
inference: if a species includes multiple individuals, if these individuals
become good only through internal self-legislation, and if political and
ethical legislation are (respectively) external and internal, then the com
mon good must be internally legislated to each, yet applicable to all.
The third step in Kant's overall religious argument comes in the same
long sentence as the previous step: the unique duty introduced here cannot
be an individual duty, as all other Kantian duties are, because no single
person could fulfill it. The most significant difference between this duty
and all ordinary (individual) human duties lies in its novel application of
a key principle of (Kantian) ethics, that "ought implies can." The underly
ing logic justifying this third step goes like this:
1.

For human beings, ordinary duties relate solely to what we know
lies within our power to bring about (i.e., "ought implies can").

2.

We cannot know whether we have the power even to work toward
creating the "whole" whose existence would fulfill this duty of the
human species toward itself.
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3.

Therefore, this new duty is unique: we do not know how it would
be possible for individual humans on their own to work toward
fulfilling it, though we do know the species as a whole ought to (and
therefore can) fulfill it.

The first premise restates a fundamental tenet of Kantian ethics, one he
has already employed earlier in Religion.19 The rationale behind the sec
ond premise can be traced back to the limits of theoretical reason estab
lished in the first Critique, preventing us from knowing (as a theoretical
fact) whether we human beings will ever be capable of bringing about, as
an objectively real phenomenon, this practical idea of the whole species
united under a common good. This has already been discussed earlier in
Religion (e.g., p. 20), where Kant insisted human individuals cannot see
into the dispositions (i.e., the internal moral motives) of other persons.
Practical reason can give us certainty that this idea constitutes our "objec
tive destiny" even though theoretical reason leaves us uncertain whether
individuals can even help to bring it about. The conclusion reached here
(serving as the third premise of Kant's overall argument) is that in this
case, we can know what this duty requires (for our species), even though
we do not know whether we can contribute anything (as individuals) to its
fulfillment.
The last sentence of the passage quoted in §II conveys the argument's
overall conclusion. Given that a new duty has been introduced, that this
duty requires individuals to be united in a "universal organization" under
ethical laws, and that "the forces of single individuals" are "insufficient
on their own" to be "united for a common effort," Kant concludes that in
order to preserve its own integrity, reason "will need the presupposition
of another idea, namely of a higher moral being," to complete the work we
humans cannot reasonably hope to accomplish. The steps leading to this
conclusion can be displayed merely by restating the conclusions of each
subordinate argument analyzed above:
1.

The human species has a unique, collective duty to itself, to pro
mote its highest good among all human beings.

2.

This new duty must establish a purely ethical community by sys
tematically uniting the self-legislation of each person who pursues
(however imperfectly) the ideal of his or her own moral perfec
tion.

3.

This new duty is unique: we do not know how it would be possible
for individual humans on their own to work toward fulfilling it,
though we do know the species as a whole ought to (and therefore
can) fulfill it.

4.

Therefore (in view of our ignorance), reason needs to presuppose
the idea of a higher moral being who can complete the work human19

19Kant refers only indirectly to this argument in the quoted passage. However,
he repeats the "ought implies can" principle over and over again in the second Cri
tique, in Religion, and elsewhere. In Religion, p. 41, for instance, he says that in every
moral act it "must be within his [a moral agent's] power" "to better himself."
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individuals cannot reasonably hope to accomplish on their own in
fulfilling this unique duty of the human species to itself.
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that the purpose of Kant's argument
in subsection II is to establish not that an ethical community is necessary,
but that because its establishment is a necessary precondition for the ful
fillment of human destiny, yet we cannot establish it on our own, we must
view the community as religious.
An important point here—one Kant never tires of repeating—is that
the necessary presupposition of God's involvement in the fulfillment of
human destiny does not (indeed cannot be used to) marginalize the impor
tance of human effort toward self-improvement. Kant's argument requires
us to believe in God in order to assist the human community to fulfill a
collective duty, yet without taking away the equally important require
ment each individual has to work diligently for moral self-improvement.
The latter remains necessary because without it we would not even have
the building-blocks to make the required "whole" possible. That is, God
cannot make us conform our wills to the moral law; but only God can unite
these building-blocks—the almost unimaginable diversity of human willing—into a consistent whole that we can picture as forming a coherent
community.
This point becomes amply clear in the second paragraph of subsection
IV (Religion, pp. 100-101), where Kant reaffirms the conclusion of his reli
gious argument, reminding us that the only ground for rational hope that
"a moral people of God" can be established is to regard it as "a work whose
execution . . . [originates] from God himself." Yet we cannot merely sit
back and do nothing, "entrusting] to a higher wisdom the whole concern
of the human race (as regards its moral destiny)." Instead, each individual
must act "as if everything depended on him." The reason Kant presents
this as the "condition" that enables us to "hope that a higher wisdom will
provide the fulfillment of this well-intentioned effort" is that his religious
argument for God's existence, as he presents it in subsection II, requires
both factors: if we individuals are not doing our best to improve our moral
conduct, no amount of assistance from a higher being can bring about a
"common good"; but if there is no God, then all our efforts are wasted.20
Only "well-disposed human beings," therefore, are rationally justified in
calling upon the conclusion of this religious argument, because only they
have made the relevant "preparations" concerning what lies within their
power to insure that this "whole" that is our common human destiny will
"come to pass among them" (p. 101).

20As observed in note 11, Peters is one of the few interpreters to recognize the
presence of a special new argument in the second paragraph of subsection II.
However, he interprets the passage as an attempt to encourage hope in the possibil
ity of an ethical commonwealth becoming real and regards the introduction of the
idea of God as dispensable (Philosophy o f Hope pp. 106, 157-161). Yet this totally
ignores the argument's progression from the assumption that building an ethical
community is a human duty to the need for belief in God in order to fulfill this duty.
Without religious belief, the argument would be powerless to convince anyone of
the reality of anything!
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This religious argument for God's existence is genuinely new and differ
ent from Kant's moral argument inasmuch as it encourages us to believe in
God not for our own sake (i.e., to justify the rationality of our commitment
to be moral), nor out of any sense of individual duty (i.e., any necessity
practical reason may impose on each of us as a person); rather, Kant now
urges us to believe in God for the sake o f our species, because as rational be
ings we realize that the destiny of our species, insofar as we are to fulfill
what is implied by our rational nature, requires something we must hum
bly acknowledge we are profoundly unable to accomplish on our own. We
believe in God as the being through whom all the diverse duties we give
ourselves as individuals (duties that, in light of each person's autonomy,
seem bound to stand in conflict)21 can be united in a single, self-consistent
tapestry, called the common (or "highest") good.
This is the main point Kant seeks to establish in subsection III, by dis
tinguishing between a political and an ethical community. The only way a
person can imagine how one's individual duties can be consistent with the
duties of others (especially all others!), Kant argues, is to regard all duties
as emanating from a single, higher source. This source cannot be political,
because then we would be dealing not with the free choice implied by the
word "duties" (i.e., with ethics), but with the external constraint implied
by the word "rights" (i.e., with politics).22*26The problem, whose solution is
Kant's religious argument, arises precisely because the nature of this pro
posed universal community must be ethical. As Kant frequently reminds
us (e.g., Religion, p. 20), other people's dispositions, the motives underly
ing their choices, remain forever hidden from our view; we therefore can
not be sure whether what other persons regard as their duty is consistent
with what we regard as our duty. As a result of our inevitable ignorance in
the face of apparently conflicting duties, we cannot even be certain we are
21The argument analyzed here provides a new way of tackling the problem of
how to harmonize conflicting duties within a Kantian framework: even though we
cannot always understand how conflicting duties can coexist in a self-consistent
moral system, we must believe that from God's perspective the whole picture does
make sense. Of course, some ethicists are bound to reject the proposed solution,
for it requires ethics to present itself in religious clothing. Hare ("Kant on Recog
nizing," p. 470) refers to this as the "coordination problem," correctly noting that
in Part Three of Religion Kant argues that we must ultimately believe in God in
order to solve it.
22As Lilla ("Kant's Theological-Political Revolution," p. 425) explains, "even if
the public peace is maintained through the law, the moral state of man will de
cline as social interaction transforms good inclinations into wicked ones." Thus,
a political community cannot be the vehicle for bringing about the existence of
an ethical community. Both Sharon Anderson-Gold ("Kant's Ethical Common
wealth: The Highest Good as a Social Good," International Philosophical Quarterly
26 [March], pp. 23-32) and Rossi (Social Authority) neglect this important point,
portraying political reform as a step toward religious/moral reform. By contrast, I
argue (in "'The Kingdom of God is at Hand!' (Did Kant really say that?)," History
o f Philosophy Quarterly 11.4 [October 1994], pp. 421-437) that, according to Kant's
understanding of human destiny, the influence of both political and traditional
religious systems must subside as the authentically religious (and thus, moral)
community gradually arises. On the paradoxical notion of a community governed
by laws with no external form, see Palmquist, Kant's Critical Religion, note VII.36.
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capable of bringing about the required unity of ethical purpose. The only
solution is to introduce a moral being who can see into the depths of each
person's disposition and would therefore have the power to weave our
different conceptions of duty into a consistent whole. Our need to under
stand how this is possible, Kant argues, rationally justifies us in believing
that God exists. Because moral commands come to each of us internally,
they are not coercive in the way political laws are, so we can rationally
hope God is capable of fulfilling the unity of purpose that reason tells us
constitutes our human destiny.
IV. Concluding Implications Regarding the Power o f Belief
In presenting his religious argument, Kant portrays divine assistance as
the only way to satisfy reason's special need to fulfill humanity's destiny.
He claims "this duty will need the presupposition of . . . a higher moral
being" to be fulfilled.23 Is this claim justified? Kant thinks it is, because the
only other option would be to suppose an ethical community could fulfill
the destiny of the species even if it were based entirely on human organi
zation. Yet if people merely select a set of rules to govern the community
of all well-disposed individuals, even if the explicit purpose of these rules
is to encourage the members to act together for the common good, the
status of such an organization would be essentially political, not ethical.
Other people are, after all, external to us. Although each individual might
legislate the moral law internally, the whole community could only guar
antee its unity by imposing these laws as an external (i.e., political) code.
Thus, if we are left on our own, without being empowered by divine as
sistance, the founding of an ethical community seems extremely unlikely,
if not practically impossible.
If we accept Kant's claim that God alone can guarantee an ethical com
munity will be established, we might still ask what his argument aims to
prove about our belief in God. Does it merely prove we must presuppose
the idea of God, or does it set out to prove the more robust conclusion that
an actual God must really exist? This is a thorny issue with an extensive
literature, so here I can only outline an answer. As stated in §I, the first Cri
tique established that the idea of God arises inevitably in the mind of any
human knower who obtains empirical knowledge, and that belief in God
is rationally possible (i.e., cannot be proved to be illegitimate), though not
theoretically necessary. The second Critique then establishes that this same
idea must be subjectively posited as actual in order for us human beings,
as individuals, to make sense out of our inner conviction that behaving
morally is at least part of living a meaningful life. Kant's new argument in23
23Religion, p. 98, emphasis added. Philip Rossi ("Evil and the Power of God," in
Proceedings o f the Sixth International Kant Congress, vol. 2, ed. Gerhard Funke and
Thomas M. Seebohm [Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1989], pp.
369-382) comes close to recognizing the distinctiveness of this religious argument
for God's existence when he says Kant's claim that the "complete attainment" of
goodness "lies beyond human capacities" (p. 371) "helps open up a 'logical space'
for an affirmation of God on the basis of 'moral faith.'" However, he provides no
detailed account of the argument Kant actually constructs in order to open up
that "space."
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the Religion passage analyzed above (in §III) can be described in two quite
distinct ways. First, we can view it as claiming belief in the idea of God is
now necessary, if we are to pursue the whole range of our duties as human
beings (including the special, collective duty of our species). But what
does "necessity" mean in this context? This is best answered by giving a
second description that amounts to the same claim: our belief must be in
an actual God (not merely in a convenient idea) in order for its purpose to
be fulfilled. For Kant's religious argument implies that, if the modality of
God's reality turns out to be merely possible (if all our God-postulation is
merely wishful thinking), our ability to fulfill the destiny of our species
is doomed to fail. We are therefore presented with a choice: either this
God we believe in is actual, thus making both our belief and our moral life
rational (for we can then reasonably hope its ultimate collective goal will
be fulfilled), or this God we believe in is a mere idea, thus rendering our
belief ineffectual and irrational (for the idea on its own could not have the
power to fulfill the immense task Kant's argument requires of God).
That Kant requires an actual God in Religion becomes clearer in the
opening paragraph of Part Four, where he summarizes the essential mes
sage of Part Three by restating his religious argument. He now portrays it
in terms that explicitly emphasize God's role in establishing and giving a
religious character to the ethical community (Religion, pp. 151-152):
We have seen that to unite in an ethical community is a duty of a
special kind (officium sui generis), and that, though we each obey our
private duty, we might indeed thereby derive an accidental agree
ment of all in a common good, without any special organization be
ing necessary for it, yet that such a universal agreement is not to
be hoped for, unless a special business is made of resisting the at
tacks of the evil principle . . . by the union of all with one another
for one and the same end, and the establishment of one community
under moral laws, as a federated and therefore stronger force.—We
have also seen that such a community, as a Kingdom of God, can be
undertaken by human beings only through religion, and finally, that
in order for religion to be public (a requisite for a community), this
Kingdom is represented in the visible form of a church, the founding
of which therefore devolves on human beings as a work which is
entrusted to them and can be required of them.
In this restatement Kant follows the same basic steps as the argument
analyzed in §III, so I shall not scrutinize this passage in such detail. The
important point is that, having completed the arguments of Part Three,
Kant now settles on a specific position regarding who is responsible for
creating the ethical community. Kant here distinguishes two standpoints:
establishing the community in its ultimate or ideal form, as "a Kingdom
of God" (or "invisible church," as he calls it in Part Three, Division One,
subsection IV), can only be God's responsibility. This cannot be a human
duty, because we are powerless to bring it about. What is our duty, as
Kant so clearly states in the above overview, is founding a visible church
that approximates the invisible ideal. Without mentioning the potentially
problematic concept of the "highest good," referring instead only to the
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less technical notion of "a common good," he argues that a merely private
religion (as portrayed in Part Two) will not suffice, as it will not have the
power to overcome the social influence of evil. We are therefore faced, once
again, with an ultimate choice: either we believe in an actual God who can
and will establish this religious community (this " corpus mysticum")24 or
we give up our rational hope that our imperfect efforts to approximate
that goal can ever effectively promote the destiny of our species.
This argument for God's existence, grounded on reason's need for public
religion, is not the only argument Kant presents in Religion that could be
described as a "religious argument for the existence of God." For example,
in the General Remark to Part One (Religion, p. 45), he employs a similar
form of reasoning, but applies it to our need for private religious belief:
For, in spite of that fall, the command that we ought to become better
human beings still resounds unabated in our souls; consequently,
we must also be capable of it, even if what we can do is of itself in
sufficient and, by virtue of it, we only make ourselves receptive to a
higher assistance inscrutable to us.
In other words: (1) each moral agent has a duty to become a better person,
changing his or her evil heart to a good heart; (2) no person can make such
a change through his or her own power alone, due to the limitations of
the human condition; (3) each moral agent must be able to make such a
change, or it could not be a duty; therefore (4) a higher power must exist,
to assist individuals in making the change from evil to good. Likewise,
a few pages later (in the paragraph spanning Religion, pp. 47-48), Kant
argues that "duty commands" us to bring about "a revolution" in our dis
position in order to overcome radical evil; yet because we have no idea
how this could come about by our own efforts, we must do whatever is in
our power to ensure our conduct is consistent with our being on "the good
(though narrow) path of constant progress from bad to better" and believe24
24In defending the thoroughly social nature of the highest good (see note 17,
above), Jennifer Moore quotes from CPR p. 836, where Kant calls the highest good
a "corpus mysticism of rational beings." Kant's uncharacteristic use of mystical ter
minology suggests he is thinking here of what he calls the "invisible church" in
Part Three of Religion. This early hint does not detract from the primarily individ
ualistic orientation of the highest good in the second Critique; rather, it confirms
that for Kant the ultimate social goal of the highest good cannot be realized by
ethics alone, but comes to fruition only in religion. Moore ("Ethical Community,"
p. 60) herself relates this CPR reference to the Religion passage I analyzed in §III,
but states only that the passage shows that this mystical community "does not
arise automatically from interaction among its members, but must be established
or constituted—in this case, by moral . . . law." Yet this is not Kant's point! His
point is that we must appeal to God in order to conceive of how the "mystical body"
of all well-disposed persons can be established. Thus, while Moore rightly says
that "Kant argues in Religion that members must cooperate with each other to
establish and maintain an ethical community" and that "our deepest and ultimate
identity lies in our membership in a moral social order" (p. 62), she never even
hints that in Part Three Kant makes these claims as part of his religious argument
for God's existence.
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there is a God "to whom this endless progress is a unity"; we then have ra
tional grounds to believe our "change can be considered a revolution."25
Kant's religious argument has two prongs. On one hand, it tells us
that the atheist and agnostic must rest all hope for realizing the destiny
of the human species solely on the abstract idea of an ethical community,
while nevertheless admitting their utter powerlessness even to work to
ward achieving that goal. How could we even begin to legislate genuinely
ethical laws to each other, given that we have no access to each other's
dispositions? The only option for the atheist and agnostic, it seems, is to
give up any hope of achieving the goal Kant regards as the destiny of
our species.26 On the other hand, seen in the context of his whole Critical
philosophy, Kant's argument guards against a false way of believing in
God, regarded as an object of theoretical cognition (i.e., knowledge), and
prepares the way for a more humble acceptance of God on the basis of
practical cognition (i.e., faith). For when a "religious" movement develops
along the former (false) lines, it invariably degenerates into an aggregate
of self-deceptive individuals who cannot hope to form a genuinely uni
versal community, inasmuch as the very people who claim to be acting on
God's behalf (through manipulative claims to "know God's will") end up
thwarting the moral ends of humanity—and presumably also the ends of
the God whose will they claim to know. This false approach, discussed in
detail in Part Four of Religion, is what Kant was trying to guard against by
developing in Part Three a religious argument that belief in the existence of
a moral God is a necessary requirement for rational hope in the fulfillment
of human destiny.27
We can now see that one of the chief objections to Kant's moral argu
ment for God's existence, when expressed as a postulate of practical rea
son, is overcome by Kant's religious argument. What Lilla says about the
"cold" comfort to be gained from Kant's practical postulates may be true
for the arguments in the second Critique; but Kant's argument in Religion
goes well beyond the postulates.28 If we interpret the religious argument
25Limitations of space prevent us from examining here the logical steps in
this individualistic version of Kant's religious argument for God's existence. In a
nutshell, Kant's point is that without being supported by belief in an actual God,
human duty would reach an impasse, rendering human life meaningless, for the
meaning of our lives is grounded in our moral nature.
26Peter Fenves appears to adopt this approach in response to his efforts to take
seriously the effects of radical evil (Late Kant: Towards another Law o f the Earth, [New
York: Routledge, 2003], p. 91): "All talk of an 'invisible church' may then become
something of a joke, since it has the potential to raise a tense expectation that sud
denly turns into nothing." What Fenves ignores is that the hopelessness inher
ent in the human situation, considered in a non-theistic way, is the very basis for
Kant's religious argument for God's existence.
27Lilla ("Kant's Theological-Political Revolution," p. 426) expresses this insight
by pointing out that Kant's ethical (read religious) community is "transconfes
sional and therefore can be seen as a threat to both [visible, ecclesiastical] church
and state." On the close parallel between Kant's ethical and political theories, see
Palmquist, "'The Kingdom of God is at Hand!'"
28Religion, pp. 412, 421; see §I and note 9, above. Ignoring the distinctiveness of
Kant's religious argument, Lilla ("Kant's Theological-Political Revolution," p. 421)

KANT'S RELIGIOUS ARGUMENT

21

the way I am suggesting Kant intended it, religious belief ends up provid
ing us with the very power so many commentators have found missing in
Kant's ethical system. As Lilla argues (p. 410): "Man is religious because
he is genuinely needy, to the very core of his being . . . Homo religiousus
is homo cogitans in action." Thus, the one factor that Lilla admits requires
us to take Kant's theology seriously is its psychological insight (p. 421):
"What makes religion possible, in Kant's view, is that reason has needs."
Lilla hints at Kant's religious argument when he admits (p. 425) that for
Kant the ethical community "is at most a 'people of God' living under eth
ical laws within an organized church." However, Lilla immediately quali
fies this with the (unexplained) claim that for Kant this assumption was
a mere "fiction." What needs to be specified when a term like this is em
ployed this way is that it has a special, technical meaning for Kant: it refers
to a concept that has no empirical grounding in theoretical cognition, yet
may nevertheless have a legitimate regulative role to play within the over
all system of theoretical knowledge and may even have a constitutive role
in practical cognition. As such, saying the invisible church is a "fiction"
does not mean we can simply dismiss it, any more than we can dismiss
ideas such as immortality or "the world" (i.e., the universe as a whole),
simply because Kant calls them fictions, as far as scientific knowledge is
concerned. Indeed, the religious community could hardly be more real,
more powerful, than it is in Religion. Whereas Lilla may be seeing Kant's
project in an overly negative way when he says Kant "robbed Christianity
of the doctrinal crutches on which it had lazily leaned" (p. 432), he never
theless rightly acknowledges that "his moral theology demonstrated . . .
that religion was a permanent human need and that Christianity, properly
reformed, was the religion most suited to man's moral improvement."
Our analysis of Kant's religious argument for God's existence has en
abled us to counter the claim often leveled against Kantian theology, that
it leaves us wholly without assistance from God. As Lilla (p. 420) again
puts it: "The autonomous man who finds himself free from these supersti
tious dogmas [i.e., sin and grace] also finds he must now bear alone all
the burdens God once helped him carry. . . . Now that man has reached
the age of majority he must justify himself." Such stark moral fatalism,
however, is not the position Kant leaves us in. As this is not the place for a
detailed assessment of his doctrines of sin and grace, we can merely note
in passing that a proper understanding of his religious argument reveals a
Kant who sees the relationship between God and human beings as one of
partnership,29 not the absolute estrangement Lilla imagines. Thus, viewing
human destiny from the divine/noumenal standpoint enables us to affirm29
claims: "The postulates of immorality and God are the most Kant can offer to meet
this threat"—the threat of "self-contempt" robbing a moral person "of the confi
dence we need to keep improving ourselves."
29Hare similarly portrays Kant as defending the need for "our membership with
God in the kingdom of ends" (Moral Gap, p. 467) as partners in building an ethical
community (p. 468): "we share our final end with God, in the sense that both we
and God aim at our own perfection." In a footnote he adds (p. 477): "what Kant
wants in our autonomous submission is both our will and God's together, neither
of them being sufficient without the other."
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the opposite of Lilla's position: as Kant sees our moral fate, we know of no
conceivable way of overcoming the power of radical evil aside from divine
assistance, we know of nothing we can do to justify ourselves apart from
having practical faith in the prototype that has "come down" to dwell
in human hearts, and—as Kant's religious argument demonstrates—we
know of no way to "work toward" fulfilling our human destiny without
assuming that God shapes our diverse moral self-understandings into a
"People of God," an "invisible church."
Kant's vision of the moral community as religious ends up looking more
like a communitarian moral theory than we normally think of Kant as
defending. As Jennifer Moore points out, however, it is different from the
communitarian vision (cf. note 17, above) in at least one key respect (p.
68): "Community must flow from moral laws; moral laws cannot arise out
of community." What she neglects to mention is that because we human
beings are all subject to an evil propensity and are unable to see into other
people's moral motivations, we cannot fulfill the duty of our species, to
form, on the sole basis of the moral law within us, a harmonious whole
that unites the multitude of different human wills that stand in poten
tial opposition to each other. Kant does not think we have good reason to
hope an ethical community (i.e., the ultimate community constituting the
destiny of our species) will somehow come into being outside of religion.
What Moore says about Kantian ethics may be true, that "to act autono
mously is in a fundamental sense to act in common with others."30 But as
his religious argument for the existence of God demonstrates, Kant offers
hope that our human efforts may help realize such autonomy-in-common
only for those who are empowered by the belief that human destiny ulti
mately rests in God's hands.31
Department of Religion and Philosophy, Hong Kong Baptist University

30J. Moore, "Kant's Ethical Community," p. 69. We can affirm what Moore (p. 66)
says of the "ethical community," though only as applied to the religious community,
conceived as an ethical community created and sustained by God's guiding hand:
"We can reject the possibility of a universal ethical community [as religious]—but
only at the price of rejecting Kant's entire ethical vision." That is, to reject Kant's
emphasis on the church is to doom his moral philosophy to inevitable failure.
31An earlier version of this paper was presented as the keynote address at a
symposium on "The Position of God in Kant's Moral System," held at Birming
ham City University in June of 2007. I would like to thank all who attended that
symposium, as well as two anonymous Faith and Philosophy referees, for their help
ful feedback.

